The classical Stable Roommates problem asks whether it is possible to have a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their assigned partners. We investigate Stable Roommates with complete (i.e., every agent can be matched with any other agent) or incomplete preferences, with ties (i.e., two agents are considered of equal value to some agent) or without ties. It is known that in general allowing ties makes the problem NP-complete. We provide algorithms for Stable Roommates that are, compared to those in the literature, more efficient when the input preferences are complete and have some structural property, such as being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. However, when the preferences are incomplete and have ties, we show that being single-peaked and single-crossing does not reduce the computational complexity-Stable Roommates remains NP-complete.
Introduction
Given 2 · n agents, each having preferences with regard to how suitable the other agents are as potential partners, the Stable Roommates problem asks to find a matching, i.e., a set of disjoint pairs of the agents, without inducing a blocking pair. A blocking pair consists of two agents that are not matched to each other but prefer to be with each other rather than with their assigned partners. A matching without blocking pairs is called a stable matching.
Stable Roommates was introduced by Gale and Shapley [22] in the 1960's and has been studied extensively since then [28-30, 43, 44] . While it is quite straightforward to see that stable matchings may not always exist, it is not trivial to see whether an existing stable matching can be found in polynomial time, even when the input preference orders are complete and do not contain ties (i.e., each agent can be a potential partner to each other agent, and no two agents are considered to be equally suitable as a partner). For the case without ties, Irving [28] and Gusfield and Irving [26] provided O(n 2 )-time algorithms to decide the existence of a stable matching and to find one if it exists for complete preferences and for incomplete preferences, respectively. Deciding whether a given instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete [43] when the given preferences may have ties.
Solving Stable Roommates has many applications, such as matching students with each other to accomplish a homework project or users in a P2P file sharing network, assigning coworkers to two-person offices, partitioning players in two-player games, or finding receiver-donor pairs for organ transplants [31, 33, 34, 45, 46] . In such situations, the students, the people, or the players, who we jointly refer to as agents, typically have certain structurally restricted preferences on which other agents might be their best partners. For instance, when assigning roommates, each agent may have an ideal room temperature and may prefer to be with another agent with the same penchant. Such preferences are called narcissistic. Moreover, if we order the agents according to their ideal room temperatures, then it is natural to assume that each agent prefers to be with an agent x rather than with another agent y if z's ideal temperature is closer to x's than to y's. This kind of preferences is called single-peaked [5, 13, 27] . Single-peakedness is used to model agents' preferences where there is a criterion, e.g., room temperature, that can be used to obtain a linear order of the agents such that each agent's preferences over all agents along this order are strictly increasing until they reach the peak-their ideal partner-and then strictly decreasing. Single-peakedness is a popular concept with prominent applications in voting contexts. It can be tested for in linear time [2, 4, 14, 18] if the input preferences are complete and have no ties. Another possible restriction on the preferences is the single-crossing property, which was originally proposed to model individuals' preferences on income taxation [38, 42] . It requires a linear order (the so-called single-crossing order) of the agents so that for each two distinct agents x and y, there exists at most one pair of consecutive agents (the crossing point) along the single-crossing order that disagrees on the relative order of x and y. Singlecrossingness can be detected in polynomial time [6, 14, 15] if the input preferences are complete and have no ties. We refer to Bredereck et al. [7] and Elkind et al. [17] for numerous references on single-peakedness and single-crossingness.
Related work. Bartholdi III and Trick [4] studied Stable Roommates with narcissistic and single-peaked preferences. They showed that for the case with linear orders (i.e., complete and without ties) Stable Roommates always admits a unique stable matching, and they provided an O(n)-time algorithm to find this matching. This is remarkable since restricting the preference domain does not only guarantee the existence of stable matchings, but also allows finding it in time O(n), that is, sub-linear in the input length O(n 2 ). In this specific case, this speed up implies that a stable matching can be found without "reading" the whole input preferences as long as the input is assumed to be narcissistic and single-peaked. In terms of preference structures in the stable matching setting, using a connection between narcissistic single-crossing preference profiles and semi-standard Young tableaux [48] , Chen and Finnendahl [9] counted the number of narcissistic preference profiles that are also either single-peaked or single-crossing.
Paper structure and our contributions. In this work, we study the computational complexity of Stable Roommates for structured preferences when incompleteness and ties are allowed. In particular, we explore how the specific preference structures help in guaranteeing the existence of stable matchings and in designing efficient algorithms for finding a stable matching, even when the input preferences may be incomplete or contain ties.
In Section 2, we discuss natural generalizations of the well-known single-peaked and singlecrossing preferences (that were originally introduced for linear orders) for incomplete preferences [28] . Entries marked with ♠ are from Gusfield and Irving [26] . Entries marked with △ are from Ronn [43] . Entries marked with ♥ are from Bartholdi III and Trick [4] . Entries marked boldfaced with a reference to the corresponding theorem [T. x.y] or proposition [P. x.y] are new results shown in this paper. Note that our hardness results for single-crossing preferences hold for the more restricted "tie-sensitive single-crossing" variant.
without ties with ties complete incomplete complete incomplete
with ties. In Section 3, we show that for complete preference orders, structurally restricted preferences such as being narcissistic and single-crossing or being narcissistic and single-peaked guarantee the existence of stable matchings. Moreover, we demonstrate that the known algorithm of Bartholdi III and Trick [4] can be extended to always finds a stable matching in two new cases: The algorithm works when the preferences are complete, narcissistic, single-crossing, and may contain ties as well as when the preferences are complete, narcissistic, single-peaked, and may contain ties. The running time for 2 · n agents increases to O(n 2 ) when ties are present. In Section 4 we study the case where the preferences are incomplete and may contain ties, and prove that Stable Roommates becomes NP-complete, even when the preferences are narcissistic, single-peaked, and (tie-sensitive) single-crossing. Our results, together with those from related work, are surveyed in Table 1 . We conclude in Section 5 with some open questions.
Fundamental concepts and basic observations
In this section, we introduce fundamental concepts and notions, arising from stable matchings and structured preferences, and we make some crucial observations regarding relation between the structured preferences.
Preferences, acceptable sets, and acceptability graphs
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} be a set of 2 · n agents. Each agent i ∈ V has a preference order i which is a weak order on a subset V ( i ) ⊆ V of agents that i finds acceptable as a partner. Recall that a weak order on a set X of elements is a transitive and complete binary relation on X. The set V ( i ) is called the acceptable set of i. For each two acceptable agents x, y ∈ V ( i ), the expression "x i y" means that i weakly prefers x over y (i.e., i finds that x is better than or as good as y). We use ≻ i to denote the asymmetric part of i (i.e., x i y and ¬(y i x), meaning that i strictly prefers x to y) and ∼ i to denote the symmetric part of ≻ i (i.e., x i y and y i x, meaning that i values x and y equally). We assume that the acceptability relation between each two agents is symmetric, i.e., for each two distinct agents i and j it holds that i finds j acceptable if and only if j finds i acceptable, as otherwise i and j will never be partners of each other. Formally, this means that i ∈ V (≻ j ) if and only if j ∈ V (≻ i ). Moreover, since an agent that is acceptable to no other agents will never obtain a partner we also assume that for each agent i there is at least another agent j = i with i ∈ V ( j ). We note that although in Stable Roommates, an agent cannot be matched to itself, it may still make sense to include an agent x in its own acceptable set, i.e., x ∈ V ( x ), for instance when the preferences of x are based on how close or similar agents are to the ideal partner of x and a partner which is "identical" to x itself is an ideal partner of x. We call an agent x a most acceptable agent of another agent y if for all z ∈ V y \ {x, y} it holds that x y z. Note that an agent can have more than one most acceptable agent.
Let X ⊆ V and Y ⊆ V be two disjoint sets of agents and be a binary relation over V × V . To simplify notation, by X Y , we mean that for each two agents x and y with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y it holds that x y. Analogously, by X ≻ Y and X ∼ Y we mean that for each two agents x and y with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y it holds that x ≻ y and x ∼ y, respectively. For each binary relation symbol ⋆ ∈ { , ≻, ∼}, we use X ⋆y and y ⋆X as shortcut for X ⋆{y} and {y}⋆X, respectively.
To visualize which agent is considered as acceptable by an agent we introduce the notion of acceptability graphs. An acceptability graph G for a set V of agents is an undirected graph without loops, where an edge signifies that two distinct agents find each other acceptable. We use V to also denote the vertex set of G. Formally, for each agent i ∈ V , there is a vertex i corresponding to agent i. There is an edge {i, j} in G if i ∈ V ( j ) \ {j} and j ∈ V ( i ) \ {i}. As already discussed, we assume without loss of generality that G does not contain isolated vertices as otherwise the corresponding agents will never be able to obtain any partner. We illustrate two prominent special cases of acceptability graphs in Figure 1. 
Blocking pairs and stable matchings
Given a preference profile P for a set V of agents, a matching M ⊆ E(G) is a subset of disjoint pairs {x, y} of agents with x = y (or edges in E(G)), where E(G) is the set of edges in the corresponding acceptability graph G. For a pair {x, y} of agents, if {x, y} ∈ M , then let M (x) denote the corresponding partner y of agent x; otherwise we call {x, y} unmatched. We write M (x) = ⊥ if agent x has no partner, i.e., if agent x is not involved in any pair in M . An unmatched pair {x, y} ∈ E(G) \ M is blocking M if the pair "prefers" to be matched with each other rather than staying in their current state, i.e., it holds that
A matching M is stable if no unmatched pair is blocking M . When the preferences may contain ties, our stability concept is sometimes referred to as weak stability in the literature to distinguish from two other popular stability concepts, called strong stability and super stability [26] . When the preferences do not contain ties, all these three stability concepts are equivalent. In this work, we only focus on weak stability. For brevity's sake, we thus simply use stability to refer to weak stability. Example 2.1. Consider the following profile:
It admits exactly two stable matchings: M 1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and M 2 = {{1, 4}, {2, 3}}; both are perfect, i.e., each agent is assigned a partner. However, if agent 3 changes its preference order to 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4, then the resulting profile does not admit any stable matching: One can check that for each matching, any agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, that is matched to agent 4 will form a blocking pair together with the agent that is at the third position of the preference order of i.
We investigate the computational complexity of the following stable matching problem.
Stable Roommates
Input: A preference profile P for a set V = {1, 2, . . . , 2 · n} of 2 · n agents. Question: Does P admit a stable matching?
Preference profiles and their properties
A preference profile P for V is a collection ( i ) i∈V of preference orders for each agent i ∈ V . A profile P may have one ore more of the following three simple properties:
otherwise it is incomplete.
Ties. Profile P has a tie if there is an agent i ∈ V and there are two distinct agents x, y ∈ V ( i ) with x ∼ i y. Note that linear orders are exactly those orders that are complete and have no ties.
Narcissism. Profile P is narcissistic if each agent i strictly prefers itself to every other acceptable agent, i.e., for each j ∈ V ( i ) \ {i} it holds that i ≻ i j.
The profile given in Example 2.1 are complete and narcissistic, and contains one tie. We note that having complete preferences means that any two distinct agents can be matched with each other. Thus, a stable matching must be perfect, i.e., each agent must be assigned a partner by a stable matching. As for the narcissistic property alone, there is no restriction on or guarantee for the existence of a stable matching. We will, however, see that for some variants of restricted preferences (such as single-peaked or single-crossing preferences as formally defined below) requiring the preferences to be additionally narcissistic make a difference.
As already discussed in Section 1, the single-peaked and the single-crossing properties were originally introduced and studied mainly for linear preference orders (i.e., preferences without ties). For preferences with ties, a natural generalization is to think of a possible linear extension of the preferences for which the single-peaked or single-crossing property holds. We consider this variant in our paper. Single-peakedness. Profile is single-peaked if there is a linear order ⊲ over V such that the preference order of each agent i is single-peaked with respect to ⊲:
We refer to ⊲ as single-peaked order of the profile. In fact, as we will see in Section 3, a narcissistic and single-peaked preference profile always admits a stable matching. Recall that if agent 3 changes its preference order to 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4, then the resulting profile does not admit any stable matching and, indeed, it is also not singlepeaked anymore.
(Tie-Sensitive) Single-crossingness. Just as for the single-peakedness property, the singlecrossingness property also requires a natural linear order of the agents, the so-called singlecrossing order. However, unlike the single-peakedness property which assumes that the preferences of an agent i over two agents are compared by their "distance" to the peak along the single-peaked order, the single-crossingness property assumes that the agents' preferences over each two distinct agents change (cross) at most once.
In fact, for preferences with ties, two natural single-crossing notions are of interest. To describe them, we introduce several notions that together partition a subset of agents according to their preferences over two distinct agents x and y: Let V [x ≻ y] := {i ∈ V | x ≻ i y} be the subset of agents i that strictly prefer x to y, and let V [x ∼ y] := {i ∈ V | x ∼ i y} be the subset of agents i that find x and y to be of equal value.
First, we say that profile P is single-crossing if there is a linear extension of P to a profile
where for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2·n} the order ≻ ′ i is a linear order on the acceptable set V ( i ) with ≻ i ⊆≻ ′ i , and there is a linear order ⊲ on V such that for each two distinct agents x and y, P ′ is single-crossing with respect to ⊲, i.e.,
Figure 2b shows that the profile used in Example 2.1 is single-crossing. Second, we also consider a more restricted concept of single-crossingness which requires that the agents that have ties towards a pair are ordered in the middle. A profile P is called tie-sensitive single-crossing if there is a linear order ⊲ over V such that each pair {x, y} of two distinct 
Roommates instance with narcissistic and single-peaked preferences. They are not single-crossing because of the following. To form a single-crossing order, due to pair {1, 4}, agent 1 must be next to agent 3, and agent 2 must be next to agent 4. Moreover, due to pair {2, 3}, agent 1 must be next to agent 2, and agent 3 must be next to agent 4. All these four conditions, however, cannot be satisfied by a linear order. agents is tie-sensitive single-crossing with respect to ⊲, i.e.,
See Figure 3 for an illustration of the different types of restricted preferences for the case where the preferences are linear orders.
Basic observations for the structural properties of preferences
Incomplete preferences with ties as used in this work are only a special case of partial orders. There are many slightly different concepts of single-peakedness and single-crossingness for partial orders [16, 21, 32] . It is known that detecting single-peakedness or single-crossingness is NPhard for partial orders under most of the concepts studied in the literature [2, 4, 6, 14, 15, 18] . For partial orders, our two single-crossing concepts are incomparable. In particular, there are incomplete preferences with ties which are single-crossing but not tie-sensitive single-crossing, and the converse also holds. For complete preferences with ties which is a restricted case of partial orders, Elkind et al. [16] showed that tie-sensitive single-crossing preference profiles are a strict subset of single-crossing preference profiles. In the following, we extend these results by considering the case when the preferences can be incomplete. Proof. The first statement follows from the observation that when a profile does not have any ties, the definitions of single-crossingness and tie-sensitive single-crossingness coincide.
As for the second statement, let P = ( i ) i∈V be a profile that is tie-sensitive single-crossing with respect to some linear order ⊲ on V . We resolve the ties in the preferences given in P according to an arbitrary order on V and show that this extended profile is a linear extension of the profile P and is single-crossing with respect to ⊲. To this end, let ◮ be an arbitrary but fixed linear order on V and let P ′ = ( ′ i ) i∈V be a copy of the profile P with ′ i = i , i ∈ V . For each agent i ∈ V and for each pair {x, y} ⊆ V ( i ) of agents acceptable to i such that x ∼ i y, let x ≻ ′ i y if and only if x ◮ y. For each agent i since the preference order i is a weak order on V ( i ), it must hold that.
for each acceptable agents x, y of i we have that x ≻ ′ i y implies x i y.
(
First of all, we claim that P ′ is a linear extension of P. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is a voter i such that ′ i is not a linear extension of i . Since i ⊆ ′ i and since ′ i does not include any ties, the assumption that ′ i is not a linear extension of i means that there are three acceptable agents x, y, z ∈ V ( i ) with
By (1), we infer that x i y, y i z, and z i x. By the transitivity of i , these three relations imply that x ∼ i y, y ∼ i z, and z ∼ i x. This means that the pairwise relative orders of x, y, z in ′ i are resolved according to the order ◮, that is, x ◮ y, y ◮ z, and z ◮ x-a contradiction to ◮ being transitive.
It remains to show that P ′ = ( ′ i ) i∈V is single-crossing with respect to ⊲. Suppose towards a contradiction that P ′ is not single-crossing with respect to ⊲, and suppose that there are three agents i, j, k in the order i⊲j⊲k and there are two acceptable agents
, and x ≻ ′ k y. By (1), we infer that x i y, y j x, and x k y.
We distinguish between two cases for x j y, in each case aiming at reaching a contradiction. If x ∼ j y, then by (2) it follows that y ◮ x and that ¬(y ∼ i x) and ¬(y ∼ k x). Thus, by (3), it follows that x ≻ i y and x ≻ k y-a contradiction to ⊲ being a tie-sensitive single-crossing order for P.
If y ≻ j x, then since ⊲ is a tie-sensitive single-crossing order for P and by (3) it follows that ¬(x ≻ i y) or ¬(x ≻ k y). This implies that x ∼ i y or x ∼ k y. If x ∼ i y, then y ≻ k x-a contradiction to (3) . If x ∼ k y, then y ≻ k x-again a contradiction to (3) . Figure 3b demonstrates that for preferences with ties, the converse of the second statement in Proposition 2.1 does not hold, showing the third statement.
For incomplete preferences with ties, Lackner [32] showed that detecting single-peakedness is NP-complete. For complete preferences with ties, while Elkind et al. [16] showed that detecting single-crossingness is NP-complete, Fitzsimmons [20] and Elkind et al. [16] provided polynomialtime algorithms for detecting single-peakedness and ties-sensitive single-crossingness. All these known hardness results seem to hold only when the preferences have ties. However, we observe that the hardness reduction for Corollary 6 by Elkind et al. [16] indeed can be adapted to show NP-completeness for deciding whether an incomplete preference profile without ties is singlepeaked (resp. single-crossing). The crucial differences are that they allow ties and that the agents and the alternatives are different while we do not allow ties and our agent set is the same as the set of alternatives. For the sake of completeness, we show this adapted proof.
Observation 2.2. Deciding whether an incomplete preference profile without ties is singlecrossing (or equivalently tie-sensitive single-crossing) or single-peaked is NP-complete.
Proof. As Elkind et al. [16] , we reduce from the NP-hard Betweenness problem [41] :
Betweenness Input: Given a universe U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and a set T = {t 1 , . . . , t m } of ordered triples over U . Question: Is there a betweenness order ◮, that is, a total linear order over U such that for each triple (x, y, z) from T it holds that either x ◮ y ◮ z or z ◮ y ◮ x?
The reduction for the single-peaked case is quite simple while the reduction for the single-crossing case is similar to the one used by Elkind et al. [16, Corollary 6] .
The single-peaked case. Given an instance I = (U, T ) of Betweenness, where U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and T = {t 1 , . . . , u m }, we construct a preference profile P = (≻ x ) x∈V for an agent set V , whose preferences contain no ties but may be incomplete; without loss of generality we assume that the elements in each ordered triple (x, y, z) ∈ T are pairwise distinct. The agent set V has two types of agents, which sum up to n + 2m agents. First, for each element u i add to V an element agent with the same name. Second, for each triple t j = (x, y, z) from T (with x, y, z ∈ U ) add to V two agents a j and a ′ j . The preferences of the agents are constructed as follows: Each agent u i ∈ U only finds those agents acceptable that "contain" the corresponding element, and has a linear order on these acceptable agents that are consistent with the following order
Formally, the preferences of agent u i are
where
For each triple t j = (x, y, z) ∈ T , the preferences of a j and a ′ j are
We show that P is single-peaked if and only if the given instance is a yes-instance. On the one hand, every betweenness order ◮ for I = (U, T ) can be extended to a single-peaked order for the constructed profile by appending to ◮ the order
On the other hand, note that the preferences of the agents of the second type require a single-peaked order to place element y in between x and z. Thus, a single-peaked order ⊲ for P restricted to U is always a betweenness order for (U, T ).
The single-crossing case. Given an instance I = (U, T ) of Betweenness, where U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } and T = {t 1 , . . . , t m }, we construct a preference profile P = (≻ x ) x∈V for an agent set V , whose preferences contain no ties but may be incomplete; without loss of generality we assume that the elements in each ordered triple (x, y, z) ∈ T are pairwise distinct.
The agent set V has two types of agents, which sum up to n + 3m agents. First, for each element u i add to V an element agent with the same name. Second, for each triple t j = (x, y, z) from T (with x, y, z ∈ U ) add to V three agents a j , b j , c j . Before we describe the preferences, let us describe the acceptability graph: For each triple t j = (x, y, z) from T (with x, y, z ∈ U ) we have
Symmetrically, for each element agent u ∈ U , we have V (u i ) = {a j , b j , c j | u ∈ t j }. For ease of notation, for each triple t j ∈ T , let T j := {a j , b j , c j }. For each triple t j = (x, y, z) from T , the agents a j , b j , and c j have the same linear order on {x, y, z}, which is ascending on the indices of x, y, z in U . For each element agent u ∈ U , its preferences on V (≻ u ) are as follows: First of all, for each two triples t j and t j ′ that contain the element u, we have
The specific order on the triple agents in T j (resp. T j ′ ) depends on the position of u in the triple t j . To this end, let
To make the preferences of u a linear order, for each triple t j = (x, y, z) ∈ T that contains the element u, let the element agent u have preferences that obey the order L k j if and only if u = k. We show that P is single-crossing if and only if the given instance is a yes-instance. On the one hand, a single-crossing order ⊲ for the constructed profile restricted to U is a betweenness order for (U, T ): For every triple triple t j = (x, y, z) from T the preferences of x, y, and z restricted to T j imply that either x ⊲ y ⊲ z or z ⊲ y ⊲ x. On the other hand, a betweenness order ◮ for (U, S) can be extended to a single-crossing order for the constructed profile by appending the order
Saporiti and Tohmé [47] showed that for complete preferences without ties, narcissistic and single-crossing preferences are also single-peaked. We strengthen this result by showing that the relation also holds when ties are allowed. We note that although Barberà and Moreno [3] also considered complete preferences with ties, their single-crossingness for the case with ties only resembles our tie-sensitive single-crossing definition, which is a strict subset of the singlecrossingness defined in Section 2.3 (see Proposition 2.1). Proposition 2.3. If a complete, even with ties, and narcissistic preference profile P has a single-crossing order ⊲, then this order ⊲ is also a single-peaked order.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ⊲ with a 1 ⊲ a 2 ⊲ · · · ⊲ a 2·n is not single-peaked. This means that there exists an agent a i that is not single-peaked with respect to ⊲, and there are three agents a j , a k , a ℓ with j < k < ℓ such that a j ≻ a i a k and a ℓ ≻ a i a k . Together with the property of being narcissistic, the following holds:
On the one hand, the agents' preferences over the pair {a j , a k } implies that i < k. On the other hand, the pair {a k , a ℓ } implies that i > k-a contradiction.
The profile shown in Figure 2 is narcissistic and single-crossing with respect to the order 1 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 3 ⊲ 4 and it is also single-peaked with respect to the same order ⊲.
There is no direct relation between single-peakedness and single-crossingness, even if the profile is complete and do note contain ties [7] .
Proposition 2.4. [7, Figure 1] Even for complete preference profiles without ties, single-peakedness does not imply single-crossingness. Neither does single-crossingness imply single-peakedness.

Complete preferences
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of Stable Roommates for the case when the input preference profiles have complete and structured preferences. In particular, we show that the in general NP-hard Stable Roommates problem with ties allowed becomes polynomial-time solvable when the preferences are narcissistic and either single-crossing or singlepeaked.
For the case of complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked preferences without ties, Bartholdi III and Trick [4] showed that Stable Roommates is even solvable in O(n) time. Their algorithm is based on the following two facts (referred to as Propositions 3.1 and 3.2) that are related to the concept of most acceptable agents. We show that the facts transfer to the case with ties.
Proposition 3.1. If the given preference profile P is complete (even with ties), narcissistic, and single-peaked, then there are two distinct agents i, j that are each other's most acceptable agents.
Proof. The statement for complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked preferences without ties was shown by Bartholdi III and Trick [4] . It turns out that this also holds for the case when ties are allowed. Let V be the set of all 2 · n agents and consider a single-peaked order ⊲ of the agents V with x 1 ⊲ x 2 ⊲ · · · ⊲ x n . For each agent x ∈ V , let M x be the set of all most acceptable agents of x. Towards a contradiction, suppose that each two distinct agents x and y have x / ∈ M y or y / ∈ M x . By the narcissistic property and single-peakedness, each M x ∪ {x} forms an interval in ⊲. This implies that the first agent x 1 and the last agent x n in the order ⊲ have x 2 ∈ M x 1 and x n−1 ∈ M xn . By our assumption (x / ∈ M y or y / ∈ M x ), however, x 2 ∈ M x 1 implies that for each i ∈ {2, . . . , n} the following holds:
By the stability definition, we have the following for complete preferences. Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that M ∪ {{x, y}} is not stable for P ′ . This means that P ′ has a blocking pair {u, w} / ∈ M . Obviously, |{u, w} ∩ {x, y}| = 1 as otherwise {u, w} would also be a blocking pair for P. Assume without loss of generality that u = x. Then, by the definition of blocking pairs, it must hold that w ≻ x y-a contradiction to y being one of the most acceptable agents of x.
Utilizing restricted versions of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, Bartholdi III and Trick [4] derived a greedy algorithm to construct a unique stable matching when the preferences are linear orders (i.e., complete and without ties) and are narcissistic and single-peaked (see Algorithm 1). For 2 · n agents their algorithm runs in O(n) time. We will show that Algorithm 1 also works when ties are allowed. The stable matching, however, may not be unique anymore and the running time is O(n 2 ) since we need to update the preferences of each agent after we match one pair of two agents.
Theorem 3.3. A preference profile with 2 · n agents that is complete, with ties, narcissistic and single-peaked always admits a stable matching, which can be found by Algorithm 1 in
Proof. To show that such a profile P always admits a stable matching, we show that on input P Algorithm 1 always returns a matching of P which is stable. Indeed, the latter follows directly Algorithm 1: The algorithm of Bartholdi III and Trick [4] for computing a stable matching with input P being complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked.
M ← ∅; while P = ∅ do Find two agents x, y in P that consider each other as most acceptable; Delete x and y from profile P; M ← M ∪ {x, y}; return M ; from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 and the narcissistic and single-peaked property is preserved after deleting any agent. As for the running time, there are n rounds to build up M , and in each round we find two distinct agents x and y whose most acceptable agent sets M x and M y include each other: x ∈ M y and y ∈ M x . Note that Proposition 3.1 implies that two such agents exist. After each round we need to update the most acceptable agents of at most 2 · n agents. Thus, in total the running time is O(n 2 ). Now, we move on to (tie-sensitive) single-crossingness.
Proposition 3.4. A preference profile with 2 · n agents that is complete, with ties, narcissistic and single-crossing (or tie-sensitive single-crossing) always admits a stable matching, which can be found by Algorithm 1 in O(n 2 ) time. The running time for the case without ties is O(n).
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.1 (i), the stated profiles are single-peaked. For the case with ties, by Theorem 3.3, we obtain the desired statement. For the case without ties, we obtain the corresponding O(n) running time by additionally using the result of Bartholdi III and Trick [4, Section 3].
Incomplete preferences
In this section, we consider the case when the input preferences may be incomplete, meaning that the underlying acceptability graph may not be a complete graph. One reason for the occurrence of incomplete preferences could be that two agents may consider each other unacceptable and do not want to be matched together, or they are not "allowed" to be matched to each other. If in this case no two agents are considered of equal value by any agent (i.e., the preferences do not have ties), then Stable Roommates still remains polynomial-time solvable [26] . However, once ties are involved, Stable Roommates becomes NP-complete [43] even for complete preferences.
First of all, we observe that once ties are allowed, neither single-peakedness nor singlecrossingness, combined with narcissism, can guarantee that there are always two agents that are each other's most acceptable agent. However, having such two agents is crucial for the existence of a stable matching so that the algorithm by Bartholdi III and Trick [4] can work in time linear in the number of agents. Moreover, for incomplete preferences, even without ties, narcissistic and single-crossing preferences do not imply single-peakedness anymore. One can check that the profile is narcissistic, and it is single-crossing with respect to the order 1⊲ 2 ⊲ · · · ⊲ 6, but it is not single-peaked because of the last two agents' preference orders over 1, 2, 3, 4. In fact, the profile is not single-peaked at all since the preference orders of agents 5 and 6 form a forbidden subprofile for the single-peaked property [2] : In a single-peaked order the agents 2 and 3 must be ordered between the agents 1 and 4 but agent 5's preferences forbid to put agent 3 next to 1 whereas agent 6's preferences forbid to put agent 2 next to agent 1. The profile does not admit a perfect stable matching, i.e., a stable matching of size three. But, it admits two stable matchings of size two each: {{1, 5}, {4, 6}} and {{1, 6}, {4, 5}}.
To show the first part of the second statement, consider the following profile with four agents 1, 2, 3, 4. Once can check that the profile is narcissistic and single-peaked with respect to the order 1 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 3 ⊲ 4, and single-crossing with respect to the order 1 ⊲ ′ 3 ⊲ ′ 2 ⊲ ′ 4. It admits two different stable matchings {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}.
To show the second part of the second statement, consider the following profile with six agents 1, 2, . . . , 6. It is narcissistic, and single-peaked and single-crossing with respect to the order 3 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 1 ⊲ 4 ⊲ 5 ⊲ 6. One can check that the profile is single-peaked with respect to the order ⊲. For singlecrossingness, observe that each pair of agents is ranked by at most two different agents so that the profile is (tie-sensitive) single-crossing with respect to any ordering. However, no matching M is stable for this profile. To see this, notice that the preferences of agents from A * := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} form a certain cyclic structure: For each agent i ∈ A * it holds that agent i is the most preferred agent of agent (i mod 5) + 1. Now, consider an arbitrary matching M . Since |A * | is odd, there is at least one agent i ∈ A * with M (i) / ∈ A * . It is straightforward to see that i and (i mod 5) + 1 will form a blocking pair for M .
For the case when ties in the preferences are allowed, Ronn [43] showed that Stable Roommates becomes NP-hard even if the preferences are complete. The constructed instances in his hardness proof, however, are not always single-peaked or single-crossing. It is even not clear whether the problem remains NP-hard for this restricted case. If the preferences need not be complete, then we show NP-hardness, by a completely different reduction, obtaining our main result.
Before we state the corresponding theorem, we prove the following two lemmas which are used heavily in our preference profile construction to force two agents of specific types to be matched together. The first lemma summarizes an observation on a profile that is similar to the third profile P 3 presented in the proof of Proposition 4.1. A = {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 } be a set of 5 distinct agents and let X be a non-empty set of agents disjoint from A. The preferences of the agents in A satisfy the following, where (X) means that the agents in set X are tied with each other.
Lemma 4.2. Let
Then, the following holds. Proof. Towards a contradiction to (1), suppose that there is a stable matching M with M (a 5 ) / ∈ X. Then, by the preferences of a 5 , there remain three possibilities (i)-(iii) for the partner of a 5 . We claim to obtain a blocking pair for M for each of these possibilities.
This implies that agent a 5 does not have a partner. Then, by construction, {a 5 , a 1 } will be blocking M . Case (ii): M (a 5 ) = a 4 . Since a 4 prefers a 3 to a 5 , it follows that a 3 must obtain a partner that it prefers to a 4 as otherwise {a 3 , a 4 } will form a blocking pair for M . Since a 2 is the only (acceptable) agent that a 3 prefers to a 4 , it follows that {a 3 , a 2 } ∈ M . Consequently, a 1 will not be assigned a partner by M . However, {a 1 , a 2 } will form a blocking pair for M . Case (iii): M (a 5 ) = a 1 . Analogously to Case (ii), if M (a 5 ) = a 1 , then we deduce that M (a 4 ) = a 3 . This implies that a 2 remains unmatched by M . However, {a 2 , a 3 } will form a blocking pair for M . It is straightforward to verify the second statement concerning the single-peaked property. As for the tie-sensitive single-crossingness, it holds with respect to every order of the agents: Each pair of agents is ranked by at most two different agents and ties only occur in the preferences of a 5 .
Whereas Lemma 4.2 enforces that a specific agent (i.e., a 5 ) must be matched with some agent from a specific group of agents (i.e., X), the forthcoming lemma enforces some specific combination of matchings inside X. This seems crucial to ensure the narcissistic, single-peaked, and tie-sensitive single-crossing property. 
Proof. By our assumption that M (x 10 ) ∈ B and by the preference order of x 10 , it follows that M (x 9 ) = x 8 as otherwise {x 9 , x 10 } will form a blocking pair for M . By an analogous reasoning for x 7 , x 5 , and x 3 , we deduce that M (x 7 ) = x 6 , M (x 5 ) = x 4 , and M (x 3 ) = x 2 , showing the first statement.
As for the second statement, clearly, the preferences of the agents in X, are narcissistic. One can check that the preferences are indeed single-peaked with respect to the order ⊲. Since no two agents are ranked by more than two different agents, it is clear that the preferences are tie-sensitive single-crossing, implying single-crossingness due to Proposition 2.1.
We observe that the acceptability graph for the agents in Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 display a certain cyclic structure if we make the edges directed: If we replace each edge {u, w} with the arc (u, w) if u considers w its most preferred (matchable) agent and delete the remaining edges, then we obtain a directed cycle. Moreover, we have already seen from P 3 in the proof of Proposition 4.1 that odd cycles imply non-existence of stable matchings. Using this observation, we can show our main result now. Proof. First, the problem is in NP since one can non-deterministically guess a matching and check the stability in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete Independent Set problem [24] , which, given an undirected graph G = (U, E) and a nonnegative integer k, asks whether there is a size-k independent set, i.e., a subset U ′ ⊆ U of k pairwisely non-adjacent vertices. We assume that each vertex has degree at most three since Independent Set remains NP-hard for this case [23] . Let (G = (U, E), k) be an Independent Set instance with U being the vertex set and E being the edge set. Let U := {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n }. We will construct a Stable Roommates instance P with agent set V which is narcissistic, single-peaked, and tie-sensitive single-crossing, and show that G admits a size-k independent set if and only if P admits a stable matching.
Main idea and the constructed agents. For each vertex u i ∈ U , we introduce 10 vertex agents u
The idea is to obtain an acceptability graph that has a cycle of length ten (see our discussion just prior to the theorem) for each vertex of the input graph, including eight for the neighbors of this vertex. This is used to ensure narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing property simultaneously. Additionally, we introduce two groups of selector agents, each with k sets:
We will construct preferences for these selector agents to enforce that each two selectors a 5 j and b 5 j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are matched to two vertex agents. Together with the preferences of the vertex agents, we make sure that the vertex agents that are matched to a 5 j and b 5 j , respectively, correspond to the same vertex.
The agent set V is defined as V = 1≤i≤n U i ∪ 1≤j≤k (A j ∪ B j ) . In total, we have constructed 10n + 10k agents.
To encode an Independent Set instance, we aim to construct preferences for the vertex agents such that no two vertex agents that are matched to some selector agents correspond to two adjacent vertices. This property will be formally captured later by Claim 1.
Selector agents. The preferences of the selector agents are of the form as described in Lemma 4.2. To this end, let
We use (U 1 ) and (U 10 ) to express that the agents in the respective subsets are tied. ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} :
Vertex agents. The preferences of the vertex agents for each vertex u i are of the form described in Lemma 4.3.
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : It remains to specify the agents r 2 i , r 4 i , r 6 i , and r 8 i . Recall that the maximum vertex degree of our input graph G is three. By Vizing's Theorem [49] , graph G is 4-edge-colorable, that is, the edge set of G can be partitioned into four subsets E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , and E 4 which are each a matching. Moreover, this partition can be computed in polynomial time [39] . Thus, we first compute the sets E c , 1 ≤ c ≤ 4. Next, for each 1 ≤ c ≤ 4, if E c contains an edge e = {u i , u j }, then we define r 2c i := u 2c j (resp. r 2c j := u 2c i ). If some vertex u i is not incident to an edge of color c, then r 2c i is omitted, that is, agent u 2c i has just the ranking u 2c
. For an illustration, assume that e 1 ∈ E 1 and e 4 ∈ E 2 with e 1 = {u 1 , u 2 } and e 4 = {u 1 , u 3 }. Then, r 2 1 , r 2 2 , r 4 1 , r 4 3 are of the form r 2 1 = u 2 2 , r 2 2 = u 2 1 , r 4 1 = u 4 3 , r 4 3 = u 4 1 . This completes the construction, which can clearly be performed in polynomial time. Next, we show that our constructed profile is narcissistic, single-peaked, single-crossing, and tie-sensitive single-crossing.
Single-peakedness. The constructed profile is single-peaked with respect to the following linear order ⊲:
We specify the notations used in the above order.
-For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and for each (Q, q) ∈ {(A, a),
n . -For each c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} the symbol U 2c−1,2c denotes the subset {u
] denotes an order of the agents in U 2c−1,2c , which makes sure that the preferences of vertex agents that are "incident" to the edges in E c are single-peaked with respect to this order. To define [U 2c−1,2c ], we need the following additional notion: For each edge e ∈ E c let u i and u j be the respective endpoints with i < j. Then, let [e] denote the order u
] is defined as follows:
where e c,1 , e c,2 , . . . , e c,ℓ is an arbitrary but fixed order of the edges in E c , and R denotes a fixed order of the vertex agents u i of the form u 2c−1 i ≻ u 2c i that are not "incident" to any edge in E c . For an illustration, assume that E 1 = {e 1 , e 2 } with e 1 = {u 1 , u 2 } and e 2 = {u 5 , u 6 }. Then,
Tie-single-crossingness and single-crossingness. To show that the constructed preference profile is also tie-sensitive single-crossing we consider each pair p of agents and let Ac(p) denote the agents which consider both agents in p as acceptable partners. We show that either all agents in Ac(p) have the same order on p or if two agents exist that order p differently, then |Ac(p)| = 2. It is straight-forward to verify that if we can show the above statement, then the profile is tie-sensitive single-crossing, and it is single-crossing by breaking ties in an arbitrary but fixed way. To this end, let
for some value j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and some values z, z ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. This implies that Ac(p) ⊆ A j (resp. A(p) ⊆ B j ). Moreover, no agent in Ac(p) considers the agents in p to be tied with each other. If there are two agents in Ac(p) that order this pair differently, then these agents must be those from p. It is straightforward to verify that in this case, it holds that p = Ac(p), implying that
for two distinct values j, j ′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} with j = j ′ and for some values z, z ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. If z = z ′ = 5, then Ac(p) = U 1 (resp. Ac(p) = U 10 ); otherwise Ac(p) = ∅. For the first case, all agents in Ac(p) have the same order on p. Case 3: p = {u j i , u j ′ i } ⊆ U i for some value i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and some distinct values j, j ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. This implies that Ac(p) ⊆ U i , and no agent in Ac(p) considers the agents in p to be tied with each other. Analogously, we deduce that if there are two agents in Ac(p) that order this pair differently, then they must be the agents in p themselves. It is straightforward to verify that in this case we have p = Ac(p). Otherwise, |Ac(p)| = 1.
. . , n} with i = i ′ and some two (possibly identical) values j, j ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. If j = j ′ ∈ {1, 10}, then either Ac(p) = A 5 or Ac(p) = B 5 . In both cases, all agents in Ac(p) consider the agents in p to be tied with each other. Otherwise, if the corresponding two vertices v i and v i ′ are adjacent with {v i , v i ′ } ∈ E c for some color c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that j = j ′ = 2c, then Ac(p) = p. In the remaining cases for j and j ′ , no agent considers u j i and u j ′ i ′ both acceptable as partners and thus, we deduce that Ac(p) = ∅.
for some values i, j, z, z ′ with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}, and z ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}. If z = 1 (resp. z = 10) and z ′ = 5, then by the constructed preferences we deduce that Ac(p) = p. If z = 1 (resp. z = 10) and z ′ ∈ {1, 4}, then by the constructed preferences we deduce that Ac(p) = {a 5 j } (resp. Ac(p) = {b 5 j }). If z ∈ {2, 10} (resp. z ∈ {1, 9}) and z ′ = 5, then we deduce that Ac(p) = {u 1 i } (resp. Ac(p) = {u 10 i }). Otherwise, by construction, we have that Ac(p) = ∅.
Correctness of the construction. We show that G has a size-k independent set if and only if P admits a stable matching.
For the "only if" part, assume that U ′ ⊆ U is a size-k independent set where U ′ = {u q 1 , u q 2 , . . . , u q k } with q i−1 < q i for all i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k}. One can verify that the following matching M is stable. -For each u q j ∈ U ′ set M (a 5 j ) = u 1 q j , M (b 5 j ) = u 10 q j , M (a 1 j ) = a 2 j , M (a 3 j ) = a 4 j , M (b 1 j ) = b 2 j , and M (b 3 j ) = b 4 j . Note that this in particular defines matchings for all selector agents. -For each u i ∈ U ′ and for each c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, set M (u 2c+1 i ) = u 2c
i . -For each u i / ∈ U ′ and for each c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} set M (u 2c−1 i ) = u 2c i . Before we go on with the "if" part, we observe some properties that each stable matching of our constructed profile must satisfy. For the second statement, suppose, towards a contradiction, that there are two vertex agents u 10 i , u 10 i ′ (for some distinct i, i ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) which are matched to some selector agents such that the corresponding vertices u i and u i ′ are adjacent, i.e., {u i , u i ′ } ∈ E c for some c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. This means that {M (u 10 i ), M (u 10 i ′ )} ⊆ {b 5 j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}. Consequently, by Lemma 4.3(1), it follows that M (u 2c i ) = u . However, by construction, both u 2c i and u 2c i ′ prefer each other to their respective partner, forming a blocking pair for M -a contradiction.
(of Claim 1) ⋄ To show the "if" part, let M be a stable matching. Then, Claim 1 immediately implies that the subset U ′ = {u i | M (u 10 i ) = b 5 j for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}} is an independent set of size k.
Conclusion
We investigated Stable Roommates for preferences with popular structural properties, such as being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. We showed the existence of stable matchings and managed to speed up the detection of such matchings when the preferences are complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked (or single-crossing). One speed-up result (Proposition 3.4) even leads to a sub-linear-time algorithm. For incomplete preferences with ties, however, narcissistic and single-peakedness even combined with single-crossingness do not help to lower the computational complexity-Stable Roommates remains NP-complete. We conclude with some challenges for future research. First, to better understand the NPcompleteness result, one can study the parameterized complexity with respect to the "degree" of incompleteness of the input preferences, such as the number of ties or the number of agents that are in the same equivalence class of the tie-relation. We refer to some recent papers on the parameterized complexity of preference-based stable matching problems [1, 10-12, 25, 35-37, 40] for this line of research. Second, we were not able to settle the computational complexity for complete preferences that are also single-peaked and single-crossing.
Third, for incomplete preferences, we extended the concepts of single-peaked and singlecrossing preferences. There are, however, further relevant extensions in the literature [16, 21, 32] , which deserve attention in the study of stable matching problems. Do our results transfer to preferences with these extensions?
Finally, the algorithm of Bartholdi III and Trick [4] strongly relies on the following condition.
At each step, there are always two agents that consider each other most acceptable.
To explore the boundary between tractable and intractable cases it is important to know which other structural properties satisfy this condition. For instance, the so-called worst-restricted property (i.e., no three agents exist such that each of them is least preferred by some agent) is a generalization of the single-peaked property. In fact, we can show that for preferences without ties, the narcissistic and worst-restricted properties are enough to guarantee that there are always two agents which consider each other most acceptable [19] . For profiles with ties, however, it seems unclear how to define a worst-restricted property so that the question of "how far one can generalize structured preferences so that the above condition still holds" remains open.
